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Abstract: In this paper, I deliberate on how we can define wilderness 
beyond designated wilderness areas. Although pristine condition is 
a primal requirement for designated wilderness areas established 
by the Wilderness Act of 1964, it is questionable whether pristine 
nature is real or nostalgia. In addition, designated wilderness areas 
could be “the incarceration of wildness” (Birch, 1990), while wildness 
complements us in the premise of wildness as otherness: uncontrollable 
and unpredictable. If wilderness is the other, it should have autonomy 
independent from human beings. To think of wilderness as the subject, 
intrinsic value is a key, which is that “wilderness is valuable just because it 
exists, just because it is” (Nelson, 1998, p.  191). Following this, Rolston’s 
“systemic value” is “held within the historic system that carries value to 
and through individuals” (1993[1991b], p.  144). If ecosystems work in 
a certain place, we could call that place “wilderness” on the assumption 
that wilderness has systemic value. When the value is confirmed, it 
is not necessary to exclude human activity from wilderness. Vogel 
(2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere across 
the boundary separating nature from society. Liberated wildness from 
designated wilderness areas is the essential quality for wilderness. On 
the other hand, Elliot (1999 [1982]) and Katz (2012) don’t allow human 
intervention in nature. They argue authenticity of nature based on the 
arguments of the intrinsic value. Two keywords of wilderness: intrinsic 
value and wildness don’t compromise because the wilderness idea has a 
contradiction between permanence and novelty. 








Since the Wilderness Act of 1964, the National Wilderness Preservation System (WPS) 
has designated 762 areas encompassing 109 million acres of federally owned land in the 
U.S.1 These areas are called designated wilderness areas to distinguish them from the 
wilderness idea. In the Wilderness Act, the definition of wilderness is that “[a] wilderness, 
in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is 
hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled 
by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” It continues, “[a]n area of 
wilderness is further defined to mean in this Act an area of undeveloped Federal land 
retaining human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural 
conditions…”.
According to the Act, designated wilderness areas are positioned as the opposite of 
areas where human activities take place. Designated wilderness areas should have no or 
little human influence. However, this principle has been criticized in terms of historical 
science. Long-term influence by Native Americans and middle-term influence by early 
European settlers altered the American landscape even before the intense industrial 
development of modern times. This paper, therefore, aims at elucidating how we can define 
wilderness beyond designated wilderness areas. Let me briefly describe the contents of the 
following sections.
In section two, I discuss the wilderness idea that underlies the Wilderness Act. Cronon 
(1998[1995]) identifies two main sources of the wilderness idea: “the sublime and the 
frontier” (p.  474). If the wilderness idea is a product of Romanticism and nostalgia, it is not 
an actual place, but an abstraction. 
In section three, I discuss how designated wilderness areas are controversial, referring 
to Birch’s argument of “imperium” (1990, p.  462). He argues that these areas are an 
“asylum” (p.  449) that incarcerates wildness for the sake of society. Turner (1996) defines 
that “wilderness is a place, wildness a quality” (pp.  83–84). If wildness is a primal condition 
for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a place wilderness. Birch argues wildness 
can reside everywhere, not only in designated wilderness areas. When we regard wildness as 
otherness, wilderness complements us as others.           
To redefine wilderness away from designated wilderness areas, in section four, I discuss 
Nelson’s (1998) arguments about the “concept of wilderness,” referring to the arguments 
over “morality” and objectivism/subjectivism between Rolston (1998[1991a], 1993[1991b]) 
and Callicott (1991a, 1998[1991b]). To identify the substance of wilderness, I consider 
intrinsic value and systemic value. According to Nelson (1998), intrinsic value means that 
“wilderness is valuable just because it exists, just because it is” (p.  191). Following this idea, 
Rolston argues that the systemic value (1993 [1991b], p.  143) is in ecosystems based on the 
historical continuity of nature without human evaluators. I argue that the systemic value 
does not fix the boundary of ecosystems to designated wilderness areas; rather, it allows 
ecosystems to expand beyond the boundary. If we regard ecosystems as wildness, wilderness 
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can exist beyond designated wilderness areas.      
Lastly, I discuss the authenticity of nature with intrinsic value, and wildness in order to 
rethink what wilderness is. Both McShane (2007) and Minteer (2001) adopt pluralism in 
order to overcome the dualism between nature and society. Elliot (1999 [1982]) and Katz 
(2012) do not recognize ecological restoration because it is “faked nature” (Elliot, 1999 
[1982], p.  388). Human interference in natural continuity is unacceptable to them. On the 
other hand, Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere regardless 
of human activities.           
2. The Sublime and the Frontier: Two Main Sources of the Wilderness Idea
First, I discuss Cronon’s (1998[1995]) wilderness idea because it underlies the 
Wilderness Act of 1964. In thinking about designated wilderness areas, the wilderness idea 
is necessary. Cronon (1998[1995]) argues that the two main sources of the wilderness idea 
are “the sublime and the frontier” (p.  474) in a historical context. If the wilderness idea is a 
product of Romanticism and nostalgia, wilderness is not an actual place, but an abstraction. 
Cronon (1998 [1995]) argues that “there is nothing natural about the concept of 
wilderness” (p.  483), but instead there is “the cultural invention of wilderness” (p.  483). He 
lists the main sources of the wilderness idea as “the sublime and the frontier” (p. 474). First, 
Romanticism changed the view toward the American wilderness from “deserted, savage, 
desolate, barren” (p. 473) and other negative images derived from the King James Version 
(p. 473) of the Bible, to “Eden itself” (p. 473). Sublime nature became a shrine outside of 
a dark cave. Referring to John Muir’s opposition (Muir, 1912, p. 715) to the construction 
of a dam in Hetch Hetchy Valley within the boundaries of Yellowstone National Park, 
Cronon (1998[1995]) claims “[f]or Muir and the growing number of Americans who 
shared his views, Satan’s home had become God’s own temple” (p. 474). Untamed land is 
not worthless anymore but is rather an invaluable place to be protected by humans before 
it is spoiled by development or exploitation. Once, wilderness was seen as an agent that 
exerted pressure on society, especially in areas surrounding villages, but now, humans are 
seen as agents affecting wilderness, while wilderness is a passive object. Wilderness has 
been deprived of subjectivity and put on an altar far away from society. “As more and more 
tourists sought out the wilderness as a spectacle to be looked at and enjoyed for its great 
beauty, the sublime in effect became domesticated” (p. 478). Sacred places attracted people 
and, as a result, were trampled down by tourists.  
The second source of the wilderness idea is the notion of the frontier, which 
supported the legislation of designated wilderness areas. Since F. J. Turner (1920, pp. 37-
38) declared “the frontier has gone,” Americans have lamented the lost landscape that 
represented American identity. Americans have tried to preserve wilderness for their 
frontier experience. They wish the frontier offered them a “free Spirit” and “individualism” 
(Cronon, 1998 [1995], p. 480). 
108
ICR Masato Tobari
That world and all of its attractions, Turner said, depended on free land-on wilderness. Thus, 
in the myth of the vanishing frontier lay the seeds of wilderness preservation in the United 
States, for if wild land had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then surely one must 
save its last remnants as monuments to the American past—and as an insurance policy to 
protect its future. (Cronon, 1998 [1995], p. 479)
This notion would contribute to the establishment of national park systems and the Wilderness 
Act, and, in a sense, wilderness works as a “recreation” (Wilderness Act) area for urban dwellers. 
Cronon (1998 [1995]) writes, “wilderness offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and 
troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us” (p. 483). Pristine wilderness is a free zone 
away from constrained urban life. Urban inhabitants visit no-man’s lands, release their wildness, 
and then return to the restricted city. Cronon (1998 [1995]) raises opposition to “[t]he wilderness 
dualism” (p. 490), saying, “[i]dealizing a distant wilderness too often means not idealizing the envi-
ronment in which we actually live, the landscape that for better or worse we call home” (p. 490). In 
terms of democracy, in other words, for equality between urban and rural people, or between con-
sumers and producers, Cronon (1998 [1995]) advocates the concept of “[t]he middle ground… 
where we actually live” (p. 490). There are no frontiers but one common ground for both includ-
ing “human” and “nonhuman.” He appropriates wildness even outside of designated wilderness 
areas. 
This will only happen, however, if we abandon the dualism that sees the tree in the garden 
as artificial –completely fallen and unnatural- and the tree in the wilderness as natural- com-
pletely pristine and wild. Both trees in some ultimate sense are wild; both in a practical sense 
now depend on our management and care. We are responsible for both, even though we can 
claim credit for neither. (Cronon, 1998 [1995], p. 494) 
Since human’ influences are everywhere, wildness is also everywhere. Cronon (1998 [1995]) em-
phasizes our responsibility for all of nature, in other words, management and care. If we value wil-
derness historically, nature includes a human history, and not only Native Americans’ culture but 
also frontiersmen’s trading posts, European settlers’ agricultural fields, and modern tourists may 
be valued. Quoting Thoreau’s saying, “in wildness is the preservation of the World” (1862), Cronon 
argues that “for wildness (as opposed to wilderness) can be found anywhere: in the seemingly tame 
fields and woodlots of Massachusetts, in the cracks of a Manhattan sidewalk, even in the cells of our 
own bodies” (p. 495). He values wildness instead of wilderness. However, if wildness makes a place 
wilderness, wilderness can be appropriated regardless of criticism of the wilderness idea. 
3. Incarcerated Wildness to Comprehend Otherness   
In the last section, I discuss criticism of the wilderness idea that underlies the 
Wilderness Act. In this section, I focus on the problem of designated wilderness area 
created by the Wilderness Act, using Birch’s (1990) argument that wilderness is “the 
109
How Do We Define Wilderness Beyond Designated Wilderness Areas? 
incarceration of wildness” in a social context. Birch argues “imperium” (p. 462), referring to 
Euro-American history, to be: “a wilderness reservation can still give the lie to the imperial 
story of Western civilization” (p. 462). This argument can be explained using the example of 
the treatment of Jews in Europe. Germany incarcerated Jews in wall-encircled areas called 
Ghettos, while Spain, Portugal, and England expelled them. The Third Reich endeavored 
to exile them; however, since it kept pushing its boundaries, Jewish people stayed in the 
empire. The Nazis’ final resolution was extermination and the destruction of every Jewish 
cultural trace, except the architecture and cemetery in the Prague Ghetto, which was 
preserved as a “Museum of the Extinct Race” (The Jerusalem Post, 2008). Ironically, the 
physical artifacts of Jewish heritage that are in the best condition in Europe nowadays are 
the ones preserved by the Nazis, who were the most destructive force against the Jews. On 
the other hand, Nazis reused victims’ belongings, including not only possessions such as 
glasses, clothes, and jewelry, but also body parts such as hair, skin, teeth, and bones. The 
Nazis captured Jews and used them as resources but  did not grant them rights.
 “Western culture was a cluster of tenuously connected islands surrounded by a sea 
of wildness, civilization now surrounds… the last islands of wildness, and puts everything 
to use, wasting nothing” (Birch, 1990, pp. 461–462). To eliminate threats, Western society 
expanded and conquered otherness, and then the proportion reversed. Society preserved 
the threat “to give humans control over otherness…. [T]he imperium must therefore 
attempt to keep its game” (p. 458). Key to Birch’s argument is the idea that we cannot 
completely remove our nemesis, in order to maintain our own identity. Before Thoreau 
argued the necessity of preserving wildness for our society in Walking (1861), he wrote Civil 
Disobedience (1849) in opposition to the Mexican-American War (1846–1848),2 which could 
be seen as American expansionism. To consider Birch’s (1990) “imperium” (p. 462), it is 
necessary to think about Native Americans. 
In the colonial era, newcomers encountered Native Americans in the U.S. White 
settlers lived next to the tribes, whom they regarded as belonging to the dark wilderness. 
However, as the frontier was conquered and the white settlers became Americans and 
began to surround the wilderness, Native Americans were forced to become remnants. 
Nabokov and Loendorf (2004) researched Yellowstone National Park and its local tribes 
and showed how these tribes were alienated from American society. 
Across the nation these “Last of…” Indians continued to function as protagonists of novels, 
or the stuff of local legends, as still today one hears about or sees evocative photographs de-
picting the “last” Indian full-blood, the “last” speaker of an Indian language, the “last” Indian 
medicine man.
These images offered a psychological mechanism for outsiders to symbolically justify the 
physical removal or elimination of Indians that had occurred or that appeared imminent. 
With such sentimental requiems for the “passing of the Redman”, by offering praiseworthy 
laments for their nobility and indulging in nostalgia for their heyday as Noble Savages and 
poignance at their extinction, non-Indians at the same time paved the way for their physical 
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elimination and freed themselves of any guilt for it. (Nabokov & Loendorf, 2004, p. 289)
This argument reminds us of Cronon’s source of the wilderness idea, “post-frontier ideology” (1998 
[1995], p. 475). Cronon insists that “[t]he movement to set aside national parks and wilderness 
areas followed hard on the heels of the final Indian wars, in which the prior human inhabitants 
of these areas were rounded up and moved onto reservations” (1998 [1995], p. 482). Americans 
lamented the loss of the frontier, which they had conquered under the belief of their manifest des-
tiny. American society compelled Native Americans to enter the American myth. The tribes were 
not subjective but objective in narrative. Native Americans were incarcerated in reservations. Part 
of their lands became national parks and then designated wilderness areas. Imperium never grant-
ed any rights to the tribes. They were managed in the remote reservations by the U.S. government. 
The wilderness idea and “imperium” (Birch, 1990, p. 462) is seen in Disneyland as well, as argued 
by Davis below.
One of the images we have of our past frontier is a place of new beginnings. It was also, 
unfortunately, a place of endings, especially for the native American population, for it was 
on the frontier where the native tribes began to view their own demise. It was a place where 
conflicts were played out: white settlers and native tribes…It was a place where even rural 
interests and urban influences met in ways that began to change the political and economic 
picture of America forever. Genocide of the native American tribes is not a part of the Fron-
tier Land we can view at Disneyland. Disney’s frontier is a much happier and joyful place, the 
illusion of which we tend to enjoy seeing and thinking about as a culture. (Davis, 2011, p. 166)
Similar to this view of Disneyland, designated wilderness areas work for American recreation in the 
Wilderness Act of 1964.3  The bill mentions “wilderness areas” that shall be administered for the 
use and enjoyment of the American people…”4  Designated wilderness areas should not be danger-
ous or filled with “savage” Indian hostility. The places for tribes’ hunting and gathering or worship 
were altered into safe playgrounds for American families. Native Americans would appear only in 
the folk tales that a father tells his son around their portable stove and dinner. Birch (1990) argues 
that “[the] finalization of the identification of the other is a (self-deceived) absorption or ingestion 
of the other into the subjectivity of the self, or on the social level, into the “system” (p. 451). Wild-
ness was incarcerated in designated wilderness areas so that we could bring law wildness, in other 
words, comprehend otherness, which is seen as unpredictable or uncontrollable.   
 “The otherness of wildland is objectified into human resource, or value, categories 
and allocated by law to specific uses (thus bringing law to the land)” (Birch, 1990, p. 448). 
Although bringing law into wilderness represents an old attitude toward wilderness before 
Romanticism, according to Birch, this view continues until now. He also states that we can 
feel wildness everywhere, referring to Gary Snyder. Finally, mentioning Leopold’s Land 
Ethic, Birch concludes, “cooperates with others as complementary to us” (1990, p. 464-
65). If wildness is a primal condition for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a 
place wilderness. Birch argues that wildness can reside everywhere, not only in designated 
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wilderness areas. Is it possible to define wilderness beyond designated wilderness area? With 
this in mind, I discuss two values of wilderness in terms of otherness in the next section.     
4. Beyond Designated Wilderness Areas: Arguments over Intrinsic Value 
To consider whether wildness is otherness and whether wilderness is the other, in this 
section, I introduce two values: intrinsic value and systemic value. The former is subjective 
and the latter is objective. First, I articulate Nelson’s (1998) two arguments for preserving 
wilderness: self-realization and intrinsic value as referred to Cronon (1998 [1995]). Then, 
using deep ecology, Turner (1996), Rolston (1998 [1991a], 1993 [1991b]) and Callicott 
(1991a, 1998 [1991b]), I examine the arguments for and against a dualistic approach to 
wilderness. Lastly, I discuss morality and values of wilderness by using arguments between 
Callicott (2010) and Rolston (1993 [1991b]). 
Nelson organizes the arguments about the “concept of wilderness” (p. 154) into thirty 
sections in his paper, “An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation Arguments” (1998). 
Challenging to the concept of wilderness shared commonly in the U. S., he encourages 
his readers to consider whether or not designated wilderness areas legitimated by the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 are necessity. He demonstrates how people have raised problems 
with the values of wilderness. Among these arguments, I pick up two critical arguments 
regarding self-realization and intrinsic value:
…a sort of asylum of reorientation where this relational self ideal can take form. We must, 
therefore, maintain areas of “wilderness” in order to achieve a complete and appropriate 
view of self. Designated wilderness areas are crucial, according to this argument, for indi-
vidual development and continued existence. (Nelson, 1995, p. 178)
This argument reminds us of the recreation value of wilderness in the Wilderness Act of 1964.5  
First of all, wilderness required preservation for the sake of American citizens, not for wilderness 
itself. We enter the asylum to form the ideal. The problem of “imperium” is shelved in the self-re-
alization argument. Nelson considers that the self-realization argument is raised by Deep ecology 
derived from “Muir, Thoreau, Leopold, and the Romantic and American Transcendental tradi-
tions” (p. 178). The notion that “in wildness is the preservation of the World,” set forth in Walking 
(Thoreau, 1862, p. 185), was interpreted by J. Turner (1996), Cronon (1998[1995]), and other 
environmental thinkers in the 1990s in order to challenge Cartesian dualism. 
 Although pre-Socratic philosophers employed a holistic view in seeing nature as a 
unified substance with district properties: Thales’ water, Anaximander’s air, Heraclitus’ fire, 
and so on, Socrates’ student Plato set up a foundation for the modern philosophy. “Plato 
developed the dualistic view of the world, celebrating the superiority of the mind over the 
body, reason over emotion, the ‘real’ world of ideas and forms over the ‘illusory’ world of 
the senses” (Marshall, 1996, p. 73). Plato made a clear distinction between soul and body; 
the body can be seen as the “prisoner” of the soul, which is the true person. After death, the 
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souls are separated while the body decomposes into its original elements. Because the soul 
is not composed of material substance, it cannot decompose. This is the logic of dualistic 
hierarchy: mind over matter, mental over physical, reason over emotion.
Turner (1996) explains Deep ecologists’ view, saying, “[A] wild order in complete 
interdependence comes freedom, a freedom unlike our civil freedoms but, I think, 
close to what Thoreau imagined” (p. 92). As Deep ecologists focus on holism and try to 
decentralize anthropocentrism harder, they sometimes undervalue humanity and society, 
which Thoreau placed weight on, unlike in Turner’s argument. One does not have to go 
to a remote place such as a designated wilderness area in order to encounter a sense of 
wonder. Self-realization occurs not only in recreational experiences but also in daily life. 
Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere, across the boundary 
between nature and society. I discuss this in section five. 
Turner (1996) continues, “Deep ecologists are desperately attempting to replace 
the philosophical foundations of a mechanical model of the world with those an organic 
model of the world…. Reason has not compelled us to respect and care for wild nature…” 
(p. 88). Turner presumes that in an ecological continuity between human beings and non-
human beings, holistic Deep ecologists would abandon dualism, and this is good for wild 
nature. However, the notions of “wild” and “care” seem to be quite contrary to each other. 
If we care for wild nature, wildness might be gone because of the domestication referred 
to in Birch’s “imperium” (1990, p. 462). In relation to this, although wilderness is defined 
as “undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence”6 in the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, managements for retaining the wild would be controversial. Turner 
(1996) defines that “wilderness is a place, wildness a quality” (pp. 83–84). If wildness is a 
primal condition for wilderness, incarcerated wildness cannot make a place wilderness. 
Domesticated others are not others anymore. Away from designated wilderness areas, if 
wilderness works independently from humans, we might say wilderness is the other. To 
think of this, I focus on the intrinsic value.   
         Deep ecologists are opposed to the idea that humans are distinct from other species. On the 
other hand, Rolston (1991b) argues, “[n]ature is amoral; the moral community is interhuman” 
and “[o]nly the human species contains moral agents” (p. 126). Then, he argues for “interspecific 
ethics” rather than enhancing human morals to include nature, adopting Leopold’s “land ethics.” 
His assumption for developing a proper relationship between nature and society is the appropri-
ation of the difference between humans and nature: “animals have freedom within ecosystems, 
but humans have freedom from ecosystems. Animals are adapted to their niches; humans adapt 
their ecosystems to their needs” (1998 [1991a], p. 368). In a sense, for Rolston, humans affect na-
ture negatively, even if we try to protect nature with benevolence: “Worse, cultural protection can 
work to their detriment; with too much human or humane care their wildness is made over into 
a human artifact…. Culture is a good thing for humans, often a bad thing for animals” (Rolston, 
1993 [1991b], p. 129). He argues that wildness is an ecosystem functioning on its own rules, inde-
pendently of society (1998 [1991a], p. 368 and 1993 [1991b], p. 129).
Rolston (1993 [1991b]) argues “systemic value” (p. 143), saying, “some value is held 
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within the historic system that carries value to and through individuals” (p. 144). Because of 
genetic continuity, ecosystems have value. The value is not in each animal or plant unlike 
moral human individuals.
On the other hand, Norton (1992) shows us deep ecologists’ concept related to the 
self-realization, “we must first dismiss the assumed but inaccurate bifurcation between 
self and nature” (p. 178). They emphasize that there is no difference between human and 
nature. Coherentists argued the coherence theory of truth and justification. Their truth 
is that one belief is sustained by other believes, in which the web-like messy structure is 
not like Cartesian fundamental structure. Norton (1992) considers that Callicott (1991a, 
1998 [1991b]) is beyond Cartesian: subject-object distinction like Rolston (1993 [1991b])’s 
human and nature.
Quoting Fritjof Capra,… ‘A basic oneness in the universe’ is also implied which in-
clude[s] the observer [the ‘I’] in an essential way”…Adopting Alan Watt’s view that ‘the 
world is your body’, this approach denies ‘the conventional separation between self and 
world’ and implies that harms to the rainforest are harms to our extended selves. In this 
sense the rainforest is intrinsically valuable if the self is. Deep ecology therefore provides, 
according Callicott, one simple and direct solution to ‘the central axiological problem of 
environmental ethics, the problem of intrinsic in value (Norton, 1992, p. 222).
Norton opposes the notion of intrinsic value, adopting ideas put forth by Watt and Callicott (2010), 
who stand on Leopold’s land ethics: enhancing human’s morality to include nature (Callicott, 
2010). If an individual expands beyond his or her skin, and becomes the environment itself, na-
ture is rendered valuable as an extension of the self. According to Nelson (1998), the definition of 
intrinsic value is that “‘wilderness’ is valuable just because it exists, just because it is” (p. 191). If we 
can appreciate the intrinsic value in nature, nature might have otherness. However, Nelson argues 
as follows: 
[T]hey would have to demonstrate that something of great social value would be lost if a 
wilderness area stood in its way; they would have the difficult task of showing that some-
thing possessing intrinsic value should be sacrificed for the sake of something of merely 
instrumental value. (Nelson, 1998, pp. 192–193) 
Why do we prefer their intrinsic value to our social value? Intrinsic value needs humans as evalu-
ators, and humans preserve nature. Callicott (1991a) focuses on locals’ benefit and insists on sus-
tainable development in terms of democracy rather than the conservation of wilderness for itself 
(p. 346). We cannot think of wilderness separated from society and history. In the next section, I 
discuss wilderness as an idea in the American context. 
Affirming the intrinsic value, Rolston (1993 [1991b]) considers that “[t]he system is 
value-able, able to produce value. Human evaluators are among its products…. Here we do 
not want a subjective morality but an objective one, even though we find that subjectivity 
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is the most valuable output of the objective system” (pp. 144–145). As the value is in DNA, 
and ecosystems generate species, he presumes that the value is in the creative, prolific-able 
systems. He argues that the value of nature doesn’t need human evaluators.  
Unlike Rolston (1993[1991b]), Callicott (2010) tries to adopt morality to the 
land. Adopting Aldo Leopold’s (1948 [1887]) land ethics in his essay “The Conceptual 
Foundations of the Land Ethics” (2010), he states, “we must become ethical before we 
become rational” (p. 226). His argument is a challenge to Aristotle’s teleological hierarchy: 
“Only creatures with the same degree of rationality can be considered equal” (Marshall, 
1996, p. 75). Only rational beings, humans, are higher than irrational beings; the purpose 
of those lower beings is to serve the higher ones. Aristotle’s theory was dominant related to 
“the great chain of being” (Lovejoy, 2001 [1933]) until Darwin’s “Tree of Life” (1837) and 
“Food Chain” (1927) were published. Callicott (2010) introduces moral-based relationships 
instead of reason: 
[R]ationality or sentiency are the most commonly posited -he, she, or it is entitled to 
equal moral standing with others who possess the same qualification in equal degree. 
Hence, reasoning in this philosophically orthodox way, and forcing Leopold’s theory to 
conform: If human beings are, with other animals, plants, soils, and waters, equally mem-
bers of the biotic community…” (Callicott, 2010, p. 233)
 Wolves value deer as their prey and value their children as their diffused gene, but those values are 
limited, while only humans have “consciousness” (Rolston, 1993 [1991b], p. 144). However, if we 
project value on nature, human’s moral community expands to the natural world. Callicott (2010) 
challenges the Cartesian view that when the thinking subject expands into the object, the inside of 
the subject corresponds to the outside of it. “The biosocial development of morality does not grow 
like an expanding balloon, leaving no trace of its previous boundaries, so much as like the cir-
cumference of a tree” (Callicott, 2010, p. 234). So, Leopold’s land ethics is both deontological and 
prudential, Callicott concludes. He tries to overcome the bipolar argument between anthropocen-
tricism and decentralization, saying that value is not in nature itself but for itself, and it is inherent, 
not reflected in us, as in the Cartesian view. 
Rolston (1998 [1991a]) criticizes Callicott’s (2010) stance of the subjectivist, saying, 
“Callicott has made it clear that all so-called intrinsic value in nature is “grounded in 
human feelings” and “projected” onto the natural object that “excites” the value” (p. 382). 
Rolston (1993 [1991b]) does not need “consciousness” or humans as “evaluators” because 
“[t]he possibility of valuation is carried to us by evolutionary and ecological natural history, 
and such nature is already valuable before humans arrive to evaluate what is taking place” 
(p. 144). According to him, nature has a value regardless of humans. “What is ‘right’ 
includes exosystemic patterns, organisms in their generating, sustaining environments” 
(Rolston, 1993 [1991b], p. 145). He argues that the value is not in each animal but in the 
whole ecosystems, called “systemic value” (p. 143). This value is not “for itself” but “in itself” 
(p. 143). In a sense, he affirms the intrinsic value. 
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…it preserves primeval nature, as much as it can. But it is morally advanced in another 
sense: it see the intrinsic value of nature, apart from humans…When we designate wilder-
ness, we are not lapsing into some romantic atavism, reactionary and nostalgic to escape 
culture...We realize that ecosystems sometimes can be so respected that humans only visit 
and do not remain (an idea that the Indians did not need or achieve) (Rolston, 1998 
[1991a], p. 379).
   
Based on the intrinsic value, he reaffirms the wilderness idea as well as designated wilderness areas. 
Ecosystems might have a right intrinsically to survive. My question is why he confines ecosystems to 
designated wilderness areas when he mentions wilderness.
 Birch (1990) casts doubt on designated wilderness areas, saying, “the preservation of wilderness 
is essentially only a next step in the evolution of our liberal tradition, which now would allow even 
the freedom of self-determination for wild nature… and this is still a (homocentric) system of 
hierarchy and domination (p. 445). The former part is similar to Callicott (2010) in terms of pro-
jecting our value on nature, but the latter part suggests the relic of Christendom consisted of sub-
jugation and the great chain of being. Wilderness designation means the assimilation of otherness 
or domestication of wildness to Birch (1990); he likens designated wilderness areas to an “asylum” 
(p. 449).   
5. Authenticity of Nature: Ecological Restoration and Continuity 
What kind of indicators identify wilderness, if wilderness does not have a legal 
boundary? To identify wilderness beyond designated wilderness areas, I have discussed 
wildness, intrinsic value, Birch’s (1990) otherness, and Rolston’s (1993 [1991b]) systemic 
value. In this section I discuss pluralism and the authenticity of nature with intrinsic value, 
and wildness in order to rethink what wilderness is.
I begin this section with a pluralistic approach to intrinsic value as opposed to 
instrumental value. Both McShane (2007) and Minteer (2001) try to overcome dualism as 
a means of developing a better relationship with nature. Then, I introduce the concept of 
“faking nature” (Elliot, 1982) and consider whether the environment holds value regardless 
of human intervention. Lastly, I discuss a new angle on wildness brought by Vogel (2002) 
and Marris (2011).
McShane (2007) acknowledges an intrinsic value based on feeling, and an extrinsic 
value based on reason, saying “intrinsic value does not mean absolute value” (p. 58). 
Therefore, there is room to accept another value, extrinsic value:  
An example of an attitude is that I think, at least in many of its forms, is an intrinsically 
valuing attitude is the attitude of love. Part of what it is to love something is to value it as a 




Her intent is to emphasize feeling, which was undervalued by Plato, Aristotle, and 
Descartes. Intuition or sensibility was always put under reason until Romanticism. Callicott 
(2010) argues for expanding the moral community, inspired by Leopold’s land ethics, while 
McShane (2007) argues for expanding “friendship” (p. 55), quoting Leopold: “land is to 
be loved and respected as an extension of ethics” (p. 55). When you love something, it has 
value. This is not projective value. As McShane’s value depends on a relationship, it could 
be pluralistic. She challenges Cartesian’s foundationalism in terms of pluralism.  
While McShane (2007) emphasizes feeling, the Dewey inspired contextualist Minteer 
(2001) develops the argument with political issues,. His concern is not only nature but 
also people. Mentioning conflicts between national parks and local dwellers, he calls for 
a “sustainable nature-culture relationship” (p. 74). Callicott (2010) expresses support for 
sustainable development. Minteer (2001) argues instrumental value for the sake of local 
dwellers in terms of democracy, saying, “protect the area’s biodiversity while also providing 
for viable human communities” (p. 74). He focuses on the local economic demands 
besides biodiversity. He advocates “this sort of pragmatic attempt to balance the various 
human and ecological needs” (ibid). Instrumental value and non-instrumental value are 
complementary, and they may offer a solution for the conflict between anthropocentricism 
and decentralization. Hence, Minteer’s value is pluralistic.
Minteer (2001) discusses strong and weak anthropocentrism. The former exploits the 
environment, while the latter preserves it but does so in anticipation of reward. Then, the 
latter is anthropogenic: preserving the environment for our descendants. Minteer (2001) 
does not regard the latter negatively. We are able to accept the anthropocentric view 
positively and manage the environment with consciousness.
When it comes to management, Elliot (1982) describes “faking nature”: environment 
restored by humans. Although Cronon (1998[1995]) values historic wilderness with human 
activity, Elliot (1982) argues that only pristine wilderness has value:  
… nature is not replaceable without depreciation in one aspect of its value which has to 
do with its genesis, its history…. we are turning the wilderness into an artifact that in some 
negative or indirect way we are creating an environment…. What is significant about wil-
derness is its causal continuity with the past (Elliot, 1982, pp. 384–385).
He indicates wilderness as pristine nature, which Nelson (1998) and Cronon (1998[1995]) crit-
icizes and which Rolston (1998 [1991a]) affirms. Elliot would regard wilderness as a reference 
to the natural condition. He argues that humans’ creativity interrupts wilderness’ continuity and 
deprives it of its value. Even if we try to restore ecosystems for their sake, wilderness loses its value. 
Elliot compares “faking nature” with “faking art,” describing the “esthetic object as an intentional 
object, as an artifact, as something that is shaped by the purposes and designs of its author” (p. 386). 
Whenever we try to fix ecological functions and compositions following the natural order, the orig-
inal status is gone, resulting in a counterfeit one.       
The value that Elliot (1982) mentions is similar to Rolston’s (1993[1991b]) “systemic 
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value” (p. 143) in terms of continuity. Rolston notes that DNA is “a linguistic molecule” 
(p. 132). Every species emerges from natural dynamic processes including natural disasters, 
which bring nourishment based on the view of the long-term geological process. 
As Katz (2012) is an upholder of Elliot (1982), he opposes ecological restoration, 
calling it “ecocultural restoration” (p. 74). The features of his argument are the affirmation 
of dualism and use of the term of “artifact” (p. 71), in a way used by Aristotelians. An 
“artifact” comes from outside of itself, while “nature” (p. 67) is independent and self-
created in his definition. For example, a sculpture is carved by hand with a chisel and a 
hammer. As an outside force affects it, the sculpture is an artifact. Likewise, “a project of 
ecological restoration is not really the restoration of a natural system; it is the creation of an 
artifact, an artefactual system” (p. 72). Katz continues, “the normative problem of ecological 
restoration [is] based on the presence of human intentionality and design” (p. 69). 
Therefore, restored nature is not nature any more, just a human creation. The theme 
of Katz’s paper is “authenticity” (p. 70). His ideal is that “the restoration is accomplished 
by nature working to restore itself, rather than a massive human management of natural 
processes…” (p. 69). Katz (2012) argues if nature can restore itself, so be it.       
He considers restored nature as an expansion of the human dominion; restoration is 
human control over nature. This argument is relevant to Birch’s (1990) “imperium.” “[T]
he restoration of nature is… a ‘big lie’” (p. 72) because it breaks the historical continuity of 
nature, Katz states. “Unlike artifacts, a large part of what makes natural entities valuable is 
their freedom from human control” (p. 71). Katz argues that nature is the wild separated 
from humans’ intention. In a sense, he stands on dualism between nature and society, 
defending the wilderness idea that Cronon (1998 [1995], p. 483) criticizes. Katz (2012) says, 
“A garden is not a natural area” (p. 74). Unlike Birch (1990) and Cronon (1998 [1995]), 
he does not recognize wildness in restored nature. According to him, Restored nature is a 
“copy” (p. 79) of the original, and it does not have intrinsic value because the copy-creator 
is not an original creator. 
Vogel (2002) shows us a different way of understanding wildness. Katz (2012) laments 
that nature disappears because of human influence being everywhere. In contrast, Vogel 
considers that humans are also part of nature and artifacts also have wildness. The traits 
of wildness are unpredictable and uncontrollable. For example, the Fukushima Nuclear 
Power Plant was destroyed by an outside force, a tsunami. In other words, the power plant 
collapsed from inside entering into resonance with a tsunami. However, Katz (2012) 
defends his dualistic view, saying, “This new use of the term wild makes no sense within 
our established grammar. We cannot dismiss the dualism of nature and humanly created 
artifacts by linguistic fiat” (p. 92). 
Following Vogel, Marris (2011) states, “Nature is almost everywhere” (p. 2), “We 
can see the sublime in our own backyards, if we try” (p. 3), and “where the wild is always 
better than the tame. But it wasn’t always so. The cult of pristine wilderness is a cultural 
construction, and a relatively new one” (p. 15). She uses “cult” instead of Cronon’s “illusion” 
(1998[1995], p. 482). She is skeptical about the existence of pristine nature. Instead, she 
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values nature with humans like Cronon values “middle ground” (1998[1995], p. 490). Since 
“ecosystems are always changing, whether humans are involved or not” (Marris, 2011, p. 4), 
even if humans intervene in nature’s continuity, nature doesn’t end according to her.     
Marris’ new environmentalism consists of humble management, looking forward, and 
creating a new environment. These are opposite to the existent environmentalism, which 
is anti-transformation for both preservationists and conservationists. However, she does 
not eliminate exotic species; rather, she accepts them as new members of the ecosystems. 
Alien generalists are often superior to local specialists, whom environmentalists usually 
try to protect. She focuses on “managing landscapes with an eye to the future, rather 
than past” (p. 14). Marris (2011) mentions, “[r]ambunctious gardening is proactive and 
optimistic; it creates more and more nature as it goes, rather than just building walls 
around the nature we have left” (pp. 2–3). Does she seem to regard nature as environment 
or the object, rather than the other or the subject that has intrinsic value? Surely, her 
argument is opposite to continuity, but “[r]ambunctious gardening” implies wildness: 
uncontrollable and unpredictable. Although both wildness and intrinsic value are keywords 
to define wilderness, they contradict each other. Because, on the hand, wildness tends to be 
changeable, on the other hand, intrinsic value is related to unchangeable.   
6. Conclusion                
How do we affirm wilderness in light of criticism that wilderness idea and designated 
wilderness areas have sustained? Cronon (1998 [1995]) brought “middle ground” (p. 490) 
instead of wilderness. The wilderness idea derived from Romanticism and nostalgia is an 
“illusion” (p. 483). Currently, Wilderness as pristine nature is questionable. Birch (1990) 
criticizes designated wilderness areas in terms of “imperium” (p. 462), referring to “the 
incarceration of wildness.” He argues that wildness complements us in the premise of 
wildness as otherness. The other brings us self-realization with a sense of wonder.
If wilderness is the other, it should have autonomy independent of human beings. I 
focus on the intrinsic value and its kind, Rolston’s “systemic value” which “held within the 
historic system that carries value to and through individuals” (1993 [1991b], p. 144). 
Because of genetic continuity, ecosystems have value. If ecosystems work in a certain 
place, we could call that place “wilderness” on the assumption that wilderness has systemic 
value. 
Intrinsic value can be seen in the argument over the authenticity of nature brought 
by Elliot (1982) and Katz (2012). According to them, the historical continuity of nature 
is severed by human interference, including ecological restoration. Since this argument 
seems to reflect the wilderness idea, human influence works negatively. However, if systemic 
value is confirmed, it is not necessary to exclude human activity from wilderness. When we 
regard some places as wilderness based on systemic value, wilderness could be already the 
other independent of human beings. 
Vogel (2002) and Marris (2011) consider that wildness is everywhere, across the 
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boundary between nature and society. Liberated wildness from designated wilderness 
areas is the essential quality for wilderness. However, their arguments lack of continuity 
or authenticity to be pristine wilderness. Continuity is quite opposite to unpredictable 
wildness. In conclusion, the wilderness idea embraces a contradiction between permanence 
and novelty. 
Notes
 1 The Wilderness Society. (n.d.). National wilderness preservation system. Retrieved November 19, 2016, 
from http://wilderness.org/article/national-wilderness-preservation-system
 2 “Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing 
government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure” 
(Thoreau, 1849, p. 1).
 3 “(2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation”; 
Definition of wilderness in The Wilderness Act of 1964.
 4 Wilderness system established statement of policy in The Wilderness Act of 1964.
 5 Ibid. 3
 6 Definition of wilderness taken from the text of The Wilderness Act of 1964.
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